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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in order to 
assess the effectiveness of the remedies provided and procedures followed by the Immovable 
Property Commission (henceforth, IPC), a mechanism that was established by Turkey in order 
to remedy displaced Greek Cypriots. It recommends changes for the improvement of the IPC 
and argues that with their adoption, the Commission could act as a blueprint for the 
establishment of similar remedying bodies in other frozen conflicts as well. Such institutions 
are not only important in terms of states’ compliance with their human rights obligations, but 
can also contribute to the resolution of the underlying conflict itself.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decades, the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth, ECtHR or Court) has 
adjudicated a number of cases where applicants, who have been forcibly displaced from their 
properties as a result of violent conflict, seek a remedy for the violation of their rights.1 This 
jurisprudence has been particularly influential in those societies which, years after the ceasefire 
that ended the violence, are still divided by ‘frozen conflicts’ not yet resolved through 
comprehensive peace agreements. Several such frozen conflicts exist in Europe and so far, the 
Court has dealt with cases relating to forced displacement in two of them – Cyprus and 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The ECtHR’s consistent response in these cases has been that the 
respondent state has an obligation to remedy displaced people, especially when the negotiations 
for the settlement of the conflict have been ongoing, yet remain unfruitful, for years.2 These 
remedies, it was accepted in Demopoulos v. Turkey3 and subsequently reiterated in Chiragov 
v. Armenia4 and Sargysian v. Azerbaijan, should be provided to the displaced population by a 
domestic institution with a special mandate to act accordingly.  
 
                                                 
* University of Central Lancashire, Cyprus Campus (ahadjigeorgiou@uclan.ac.uk). I would like to thank Dr 
Nikolas Kyriakou, Dr Aris Constantinides, Dr Arman Sarvarian, Dr Stephanie Laulhe Shaelou and the anonymous 
reviewer for their comments. Any remaining errors are my own. 
1 T Allen and B Douglas, ‘Closing the Door on Restitution: The European Court of Human Rights’ in A Buyse 
and M Hamilton (eds), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights (CUP, 2011). The 
Registrar of the ECtHR noted in 2014 that while the Court ‘cannot settle war-like conflicts between states’, it has 
been called to deal with approximately 3,000 such cases; many of these cases concern property disputes. (Steering 
Committee for Human Rights, Committee of Experts on the Reform of the Court, ‘Presentation to the 3rd Meeting 
by the Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights’ (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2014), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/GT-GDR-F/GT-GDR-F(2014)21-Speech-Erik-
Fribergh-24092014%20(2).pdf [last accessed 31 May 2016].  
2 See for example, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (Application no. 40167/06) (2015), paras 236-237. 
3 Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (Application no. 46113/99) (2010) 50 E.H.R.R. SE14. 
4 Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (Application no. 13216/05) (2015). 
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In light of the numerous examples of forced displacement as a result of frozen conflicts, and 
the possibility that it can act as a blueprint for them, this article examines the remedies provided 
and procedures followed by the Immovable Property Commission (henceforth, IPC or 
Commission) in Cyprus. It argues that any institution established to remedy forced 
displacement should aim to achieve two objectives: first, it should comply with human rights 
and second, it should work towards the unfreezing of the conflict by building trust between its 
different parties. Drawing lessons from the experiences of the IPC, the ECtHR’s case law and 
other key international policy documents, the article seeks to provide guidelines for the 
establishment and operation of such remedying bodies. These guidelines could be useful, 
particularly to the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan that are currently under an 
obligation to comply with the ECtHR’s Chiragov/Sargysian judgments, but also to other 
countries affected by frozen conflicts in Europe and elsewhere. At the same time, this analysis 
remains relevant to Cyprus, whose leaders are optimistic about the outcome of the ongoing 
negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement.5 If the negotiations are successful, the 
experiences of the IPC could provide useful insights for the establishment of a new body that, 
once and for all, will afford a remedy to everyone who has been displaced by the conflict on 
the island.     
 
II.  FROZEN CONFLICTS AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN EUROPE  
 
Frozen conflicts are characterised by the eruption of violence between two or more groups, 
followed by a ceasefire agreement which, although it results in the stopping of the altercations, 
does not permanently resolve the disagreement between the previously warring parties. Thus, 
although the situation is stable, sometimes even safe, the unresolved conflict lingers and the 
unsatisfactory status quo is maintained. The parties might refuse to acknowledge each other or 
conversely, they might participate in perpetual, yet ineffective, negotiations; in both cases 
however, the zero-sum nature of their disagreement makes them unable to reach a settlement 
for their common future. Such frozen conflicts in Europe include Cyprus, Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, with political analysts being concerned that Eastern 
Ukraine is also heading in the same direction.6  
 
These frozen conflicts share important similarities that make a comparison between them 
valuable. The first such similarity is that they have all resulted, to different extents, in instances 
of forced displacement. Approximately 45,000 Turkish Cypriots (henceforth, TC) and 165,000 
Greek Cypriots (hereafter, GC) have been displaced during the conflict on the island.7 
Similarly, since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been 240,000 displaced persons in 
Abkhazia,8 800,000 Azeri refugees in Nagorno-Karabakh,9 and 50,000 in Transnistria.10 
Moreover, the 2008 Russian-Georgian war resulted in approximately 120,000 refugees from 
                                                 
5 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, ‘Joint Statement by the Turkish Cypriot Leader Mr. Mustafa 
Akinci and Greek Cypriot Leader Mr. Nicos Anastasiades’, available at https://unficyp.unmissions.org/joint-
statement-turkish-cypriot-leader-mr-mustafa-akıncı-and-greek-cypriot-leader-mr-nicos [last accessed 17 June 
2016].  
6 International Crisis Group (henceforth, ICG), ‘Russia and the Separatists in Eastern Ukraine’ (Kiev/Brussels: 
ICG, 2016), p 1. 
7 Global IDP Database, ‘Profile of Internal Displacement: Cyprus’ (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council/ Global 
IDP Project, 2003), p 6, citing estimates of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. 
8 Global IDP Database, ‘Profile of Internal Displacement: Georgia’ (Gevena: Norwegian Refugee Council/Global 
IDP Project, 2005), p 6, citing estimates of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
9 See note 4 above, para 25. 
10 Z Brunarska and A Weinar, ‘Asylum Seekers, Refugees and IDPs in the EaP Countries: Recognition, Social 
Protection and Integration – An Overview’ (CARIM-East Research Report 2013/45), p 5.  
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South Ossetia,11 with some 20,000 ethnic Georgians still remaining unable to return to their 
houses.12 While forced displacement is a characteristic of violent contexts more generally, 
frozen conflicts face additional challenges to the usual ones. The most important such challenge 
concerns the passage of time and the fact that in the years that passed since the displacement, 
other people might have moved in the properties in question.13 The longer the period since the 
war, the more necessary it becomes to balance any interests the secondary occupiers might 
have acquired with those of the original property owners.14 Yet, the complexity of this 
balancing exercise is not reflected in the seminal UN Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons (henceforth, the Pinheiro Principles), which 
merely declare that ‘All refugees and displaced persons have the right to have restored to them 
any housing, land and/or property of which they were arbitrarily or unlawfully deprived.’15 
Since restitution returns the displaced population to its original position to the greatest possible 
extent, it is only right that it is the international community’s preferred remedy. While however, 
its use is uncontroversial in conflicts that have lasted for a relatively short period of time, it 
creates difficulties of principle and application in frozen conflicts.16 Examining how this 
balance has been struck and displacement has been remedied in one frozen conflict, can provide 
useful lessons about how similar questions can be addressed in another.  
 
The second similarity between such conflicts concerns the fact that they all tend to be 
characterised by a lack of trust between the different groups of the population. Although frozen 
conflicts usually result in relatively stable conditions on the ground, uncertainty about how 
they will develop in the future contributes to feelings of insecurity among the public.17 In turn, 
this often translates to a lack of trust both towards the politicians that are negotiating the 
settlement and between the populations of the different parties to the conflict.18 It is therefore 
important that if a remedying mechanism is established in such societies, especially when it is 
concerned with such a sensitive issue as forced displacement, it takes steps to improve trust 
levels between the politicians and the population and also among the people themselves. 
However, while ‘restoring public trust in national institutions of governance’19 is among the 
key objectives of transitional justice, and although post-conflict societies often establish 
institutions with this mandate, trust-building has received far less attention in contexts of frozen 
                                                 
11 ICG, ‘Russia v. Georgia: The Fallout’ (Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG, 2008), p 3. 
12 ICG, ‘South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition’ (Tskhinvali/Tbilisi/Istanbul/Moscow/Brussels: ICG, 2010), 
p i.  
13 A Smit, The Property Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Beyond Restitution (Routledge, 
2012), p 170.  
14 Laura Matson, ‘Competing Land Rights, Legal Redress, and Political Settlement in Cyprus’ (2012) 31 Law and 
Inequality 199.  
15 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ‘Principles on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons’ (Geneva: UN, 2005), Principle 2.1. 
16 See note 13 above. 
17 Despite the stable status quo in Cyprus, more than 70% of GC and TC believe that security should be the 
‘highest priority item’ during the peace negotiations. (A Lordos and E Kaymak, ‘Public Opinion and the Property 
Issue: Quantitative Findings’ (Cyprus: Interpeace, 2010).) 
18 For an illustration of this in Nagorno-Karabakh, see ICG, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough’ 
(Baku/Yerevan/Tbilisi/Brussels: ICG, 2009), p 1 and 8. Conversely for the case of Cyprus, Matson (note 14 above, 
p 230) argues that GC and TC enjoy greater levels of trust and do not seem to be divided by the ‘ancient hatreds’ 
that characterise other such societies. With respect, the never-ending, unfruitful negotiations, the nationalist 
rhetoric of both GC and TC politicians and the overwhelming rejection of the UN-sponsored Annan Plan (see not 
132 below) by the GC community, suggest otherwise.  
19 UN Secretary-General, ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies’ (New 
York: UN, 2004), para 1.  
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conflicts.20 This is puzzling because trust-building is as important to a society that is 
negotiating a peace agreement, as it is to one that has already completed the negotiations and 
is in the process of building the common institutions that have been agreed. Peacebuilders 
usually focus on transitional justice mechanisms after a comprehensive peace settlement has 
been reached, but there is nothing that prevents parties from adopting such mechanisms before, 
or even in order to aid, the successful completion of the negotiation process. This was 
confirmed by Judge Ziemele in Sargsyan, when he argued that remedying the displaced people 
could ‘be a way of moving towards finding a solution to the conflict’.21 
 
Thus, and although it has rarely been perceived as such, the IPC should be seen and evaluated 
as a rather unique example of transitional justice mechanisms.22 If it is successful, such a 
mechanism could contribute to the unfreezing of the conflict in two ways. On the one hand, it 
could make a direct contribution to conflict settlement by protecting the human rights of the 
displaced population; in turn, this could put the victims in their original position as much as 
possible and allow them to eventually leave the conflict behind them.23 On the other, it could 
make symbolic contributions to the resolution of the conflict by sending messages of 
reconciliation to the population at large.24 When responding to forced displacement in frozen 
conflicts therefore, the objective should not only be to provide effective remedies in the 
legalistic and technical sense of the word, but also to address the root of the problem and ensure 
that these contribute to the betterment of inter-ethnic relations among the people of the divided 
society. As Shelton put it, in cases of armed conflict ‘reparations are often a matter of 
compromise and look to the future as much as to the past’.25 
 
The final common characteristic of frozen conflicts is that with the passage of time, the political 
and legal context in which they are negotiated, changes. The institution that has altered in the 
most dynamic way this context in Europe is the ECtHR.26 Of Europe’s frozen conflicts, two – 
Cyprus and Nagorno-Karabakh – have resulted in decisions of the Court relating to forced 
displacement. The (GC) cases against Turkey, and in particular Cyprus v. Turkey and Loizidou 
v. Turkey,27 are well known among the academic community.28 In the admissibility decision of 
Loizidou, the Court reached two findings with significant implications for frozen conflicts:29 
first, that Turkey was in effective control over the north of Cyprus and therefore responsible 
                                                 
20 Although some confidence-building measures have been adopted in Cyprus, these have received a lot less 
attention by the media and the peacebuilders themselves, than the formal negotiations. (M Hadjipavlou and B 
Kanol, ‘Cumulative Impact Case Study: The Impact of Peacebuilding Work on the Cyprus Conflict’ (Nicosia: 
CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2008).) 
21 See note 2 above, Concurring Opinion of Judge Ziemele, para 7. See also, Council of Europe Parliamentary 
Assembly, ‘Europe’s Forgotten People: Protecting the Human Rights of Long-term Displaced Persons’ 
(Recommendation 1877 (2009)), which recommends in para 10 that in cases of frozen conflicts, ‘[t]ransitional 
justice measures have to be established to address wrongs suffered (including arbitrary displacement)’.  
22 N Skoutaris, ‘Building Transitional Justice Mechanisms without a Peace Settlement: A Critical Appraisal of 
Recent Case Law of the Strasbourg Court on the Cyprus Issue’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 720.  
23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda 
(OUP, 1997), p 162. 
24 D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (OUP, 2006, 2nd edn.), pp 16-17 and 150.  
25 Ibid., p 430. 
26 See P Leach, ‘Thawing the Frozen Conflict? The European Court’s Nagorno-Karabakh Judgments’ (EJIL blog, 
posted on 6 July 2015) available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/thawing-the-frozen-conflict-the-european-courts-
nagorno-karabakh-judgments/ [last accessed 31 May 2016], arguing that the Court’s recent case law is showing 
its greater willingness to become involved in such frozen conflicts.  
27 Loizidou v. Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 513 (Merits). 
28 The Cypriot conflict has also given rise to TC applications to the ECtHR. For an analysis of these, see N 
Hadjigeorgiou, ‘Case Note on Kazali and Others v. Cyprus’ (2013) 2 Cyprus Human Rights Law Review 103.  
29 Loizidou v. Turkey (Application no. 15318/89) (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 99 (Preliminary Objections). 
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for any violations that are taking place there; the self-declaration of the ‘Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus’ (hereafter, ‘TRNC’) as an independent state could not shield Turkey from 
its human rights obligations.30 Second, even though the displacement of the applicant had taken 
place in 1974, there was a continuing interference with her right to use her property that 
persisted (and was renewed every day) until the violation had been remedied.31 Both of these 
conclusions have been reiterated in Chiragov, in which the Court held that Armenia was 
responsible for violations of the right to property of displaced people in Nagorno-Karabakh 
because, like Turkey in northern Cyprus, it has been in effective control of the region.32  
 
At the merits stage of Loizidou, the Court held that the prevention of the applicant to use her 
property by the Turkish military constituted a violation of the right to property under Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 (henceforth, Article 1-1) of the European Convention. This created an 
obligation on Turkey to remedy the applicant, not for the loss of the property itself, but for her 
inability to access and use it. Thus, even after she had been remedied, the applicant remained 
the owner of the property, an important consideration in light of the developments following 
the establishment of the IPC. The Court confirmed its Loizidou findings in Cyprus v. Turkey, 
where before finding a violation of Article 1-1, it held that it was not necessary to exhaust 
domestic remedies, thus granting the applicant direct access to it, because the practices of the 
‘TRNC’ were discriminatory against GC and, therefore, ineffective.33 Loizidou’s findings were 
endorsed and expanded in the numerous cases with identical facts that followed, such as 
Demades v. Turkey, in which the Court held that the prevention of the applicant to access his 
house did not only constitute a violation of the right to property, but also of the right to home, 
as protected under Article 8 of the European Convention.34  
 
The Loizidou line of cases changed the context in which the Cypriot negotiations were taking 
place since they provided, for the first time, an authority for the view that leaving the displaced 
population without any remedy at all was not an option. Nevertheless, it is the case of Xenides-
Arestis v. Turkey and the admissibility decision of Demopoulos v. Turkey that most vividly 
show the dynamic effects of the ECtHR jurisprudence.35 In Xenides-Arestis, Turkey argued 
that a newly created mechanism, the IPC, provided an effective remedy that the applicants 
should exhaust before having access to the ECtHR. The Court accepted the argument in 
principle, but ultimately held that the composition of the IPC and the remedies it was providing 
at the time, were in need of further improvement. It was 5 years later in Demopoulos that the 
ECtHR finally held that the amended IPC Law and the Commission it gave rise to provided 
effective remedies to GC applicants.36 In this case, the Court also went back to some of its 
previous decisions and held that the applicant’s complaint about a violation of Article 8 was 
manifestly ill-founded because the passage of time had weakened her links to her home and, 
                                                 
30 Ibid., para 63. 
31 See note 27 above, para 41.  
32 See note 4 above, para 186. Conversely, Azerbaijan’s responsibility was engaged because the displacement had 
taken place in its internationally recognised territory, where it has an obligation to take positive actions to protect 
human rights. While Azerbaijan restricted access to Nagorno-Karabakh for legitimate reasons, it still violated the 
right to property because it did not compensate the displaced population in any way. (See note 2 above, paras 223-
226 and 234.) 
33 Cyprus v. Turkey (Application no. 25781/94) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 30, paras 99, 172 and 184. 
34 Demades v. Turkey (Application no. 16219/90) (2003).  
35 Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (Application no. 46347/99) (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. SE13. 
36 See note 3 above, para 90. 
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as a result, ‘the holding of a title [… was] emptied of any practical consequences’.37 
Importantly, this aspect of the ECtHR’s decision has impacted on the provision of remedies, in 
particular restitution and compensation, by the IPC.  
 
In Demopoulos, the applicant and the Cypriot government that supported his claim, repeated 
the arguments that the Court had already dismissed in Xenides-Arestis, namely that the IPC 
could not, as a matter of principle, provide an effective remedy because it was the product of 
an illegal invasion and it was established by an entity that was not recognised in international 
law. Both arguments were again rejected by the Court, which declared that the IPC was 
established, not by the ‘TRNC’, but by Turkey.38 This is a legaly persuasive argument and a 
convenient way of sidestepping the difficult question of the legitimacy and legality of both the 
‘TRNC’ and the IPC. Nevertheless, disagreements of principle cannot be completely separated 
from questions of practical effectiveness, especially because they can influence the provision 
of the remedies of restitution and exchange. Ironing this crease out, the Court held that the 
mechanisms provided by Turkey could not be by definition ineffective because that would 
mean that the applicants were not actually expecting the respondent state to remedy them in 
some way, which would render their resort to the ECtHR futile.39 Thus, Demopoulos has 
changed the context relating to forced displacement in Cyprus because since then, applicants 
have had to exhaust domestic remedies, and in particular apply to the IPC in order to obtain 
access to the ECtHR. Whether these domestic remedies are effective as a matter of practice, 
rather than principle, is not an argument that was seriously pursued by the applicants or that 
has been discussed by academics since then.40 It is this gap in the literature that the subsequent 
analysis seeks to address. 
 
Before commencing on an assessment of the IPC, one final caveat must be made: the 
Commission is an organ that is clouded in secrecy, which creates difficulties if one’s objective 
is to examine its practical effectiveness. Ideally, such an exercise would focus on the IPC’s 
decisions and enforced rules of procedure. On the one hand, these would provide basic 
information, like the start and end date of a case, the type of remedy each applicant asked for 
and what s/he ultimately received. On the other, they would allow for an evaluation of the 
IPC’s reasoning and shed light on its procedures. Nevertheless, no such decisions exist. So far, 
the Commission has finalised 935 applications, 913 of which have been completed through a 
friendly settlement process;41 for these cases, no evidence at all is made available. The specific 
remedies asked for and ultimately provided in each case are unknown, as are the start and end 
dates of the process. The remaining 22 cases have been completed through hearings, but here 
as well, the reasoning of the IPC – or any other information concerning the case – remains 
publically unavailable.  
 
                                                 
37 Ibid., para 111. For a criticism of the Court’s decision in relation to the right to home, see C Paraskeva and E 
Meleagrou, ‘Homes from the Past: An Expiration Date for the Right to Respect for Home Under Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012-2013) VII Annaire International Des Droits De L’Homme 845. 
38 See note 3 above, para 95.  
39 Ibid., para 89. 
40 The literature on Demopoulos has mostly dealt with the question of whether the IPC could provide effective 
remedies as a matter of principle, rather than practice. See, for example, E Katselli-Proukaki, ‘The Right of 
Displaced Persons to Property and to Return Home after Demopoulos’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 701; 
L Loucaides, ‘Is the European Court of Human Rights Still a Principled Court of Human Rights after the 
Demopoulos Case?’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of International Law 435.  
41 Presidency of IPC, ‘Monthly Bulletin, May 2016’, (Nicosia: IPC, May 2016), available at 
http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/dokuman/istatistik_mayıs16ing.pdf [last accessed 31 May 2015]. 
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Thus, this article assesses the effectiveness of the IPC by relying on the few documents that 
are publically available and on a series of interviews that were conducted in Cyprus during the 
period of November 2014 – March 2015. Few applicants openly admit that they have gone to 
the IPC because those who do are labelled among many in the GC community as ‘traitors’, as 
collaborating with the ‘enemy’ and selling their patrimonial land for financial gain.42 Because 
of the difficulty in identifying individual applicants, the interviews focused on people that are 
involved in their professional capacity with the IPC. Such professionals were easier to identify 
and persuade to interview, while, as a result of their regular involvement with the Commission, 
they had a more all-round understanding of its strengths and limitations. Overall, 8 interviews 
were carried out: 3 with GC private lawyers, 3 with TC private lawyers, 1 with a TC land 
surveyor and 1 with a lawyer from the RoC’s Attorney-General’s office.43 Combined, the 
interviewees have represented approximately 700 out of the 6286 applications that have been 
submitted to the Commission to date, thus providing, through the recollection of their 
experiences, an accurate picture of the IPC’s practices.44 The semi-structured interviews lasted 
between 1-2 hours each and all of them were given on condition of anonymity. The views of 
the participants are of course subjective and they cannot replace hard facts about the 
effectiveness of the IPC. However, on a surprising number of issues, the participants had very 
similar views of the Commission, thus making it possible to draw some preliminary 
conclusions about its effectiveness. 
 
 
III. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY THE IPC 
 
The IPC was created by Law 67/2005, which gives GC who were displaced from their 
properties in 1974, the opportunity to be remedied for the loss they suffered.45 In principle, 
applicants can choose from three types of remedies: payment of compensation for the loss of 
their property; its return (restitution); or the exchange of their property found in the north of 
the island, with a TC property of equal value in the south.46 Nevertheless, in practice, the first 
of the three is by far the most popular: of the 759 applicants that have been remedied so far, 
746 have received compensation.47 If the applicant has been awarded one of the three remedies, 
he also becomes entitled to compensation for loss of use of that property from 1974 until 
today.48 It is however, impossible for an applicant to request only compensation for loss of use 
without also claiming compensation, exchange or restitution of the property itself. Bearing in 
mind that the applicants who originally resorted to the ECtHR were only demanding a remedy 
for the loss of use of their properties, GC perceive this provision of the law as unfair. They are 
arguing that in essence Turkey is giving with the one hand and taking with the other since one 
                                                 
42 See, for example, comments from the RoC Minister of the Interior that if the applications to the IPC continue 
with the same pace, ‘then we will solve the Cyprus problem on our own, in the worst possible way because there 
will be nothing left to negotiate (with regards to properties), nor to exchange. So, on our own, we will partition 
Cyprus. There can be no homeland without the land.’ (author’s translation, ‘Statements of the Minister of the 
Interior’ (16 June 2013), available at 
http://www.pio.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/All/5BBD393E78B6C0F0C2257B8C0042802C?OpenDocument&highli
ght=16/06/2013 [last accessed 17 June 2016]).  
43 Attempts were made to hold an interview with an IPC member of staff as well, but these were unsuccessful. 
44 See note 41 above.   
45 (‘TRNC’) Law No. 67/2005 (‘Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties 
which are within the scope of sub-paragraph (B) of paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the Constitution’). 
46 Law 67/2005, Section 4(1). 
47 See note 41 above, p 5.    
48 Law 67/2005, Section 8. 
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can only become remedied for loss of use if he is willing to give up the title of the property 
itself (in the vast number of cases in lieu of compensation).  
 
In addition to this general criticism of the IPC, this section engages with the concerns that have 
been raised about each of the specific remedies and reaches three conclusions. First, despite 
the relatively low compensation amounts awarded by the Commission, this is unlikely to 
constitute a violation of the right to property. However, in order for this remedy to contribute 
to feelings of trust among previously warring parties, the Commission should justify its 
decisions and explain to the applicants the considerations that have affected the specific 
compensation amounts they received. Second, implementing the remedy of exchange results 
in confusion about who is entitled to what and seriously undermines the objective of building 
trust among the two communities. This suggests that when remedying bodies are being 
designed, close attention should be paid to the remedies that are made available to the 
applicants and the effects these can have, not only on the specific displaced person, but also on 
the population at large. Third, the strict requirements that the remedy of restitution is subject 
to, do not in themselves constitute a violation of the right to property. However, where the IPC 
interprets and applies them in such a way as to render the remedy completely unavailable, this 
can result in violations of both the right to property and fair trial. It is therefore necessary that 
remedying bodies take steps to ensure that they are interpreting the law accurately, rather than 
allowing political considerations to cloud their judgements.    
 
A. The remedy of compensation 
 
One of the most serious complaints against the IPC is that the compensation amount it offers 
to the applicants is so much lower than the market price that it does not qualify as an effective 
remedy at all.49 Assessing the accuracy of this complaint is difficult both because of lack of 
information and due to several disagreements of principle between the two sides. Every month, 
the IPC publishes information about the number of cases it has settled and the total 
compensation amount it has paid during that period. However, it does not disclose how much 
has been awarded for individual and identifiable pieces of land. Law 67/2005 provides that the 
compensation amount should be determined by taking into account four factors: the market 
value of the property in 1974; the loss of income and increase in the value of the property from 
then until the date of payment; whether the applicant is in possession of any TC property in the 
RoC-controlled areas; and whether s/he is receiving income from such a property.50 
Nevertheless, these factors have not been elaborated on by the IPC, thus  making it unclear, for 
example, whether an applicant who has lost his/her home and another who has lost a plot of 
land in the same village, should be compensated in the same way. Potentially, this weakness 
of the IPC could have been avoided, had the ECtHR adopted a more principled approach when 
dealing with the concept of the ‘home’ in Demopoulos.  
 
The lack of guidance about the compensation applicants should expect can be problematic in 
light of the ECtHR’s case law in relation to Article 1-1, which provides that the law in question 
must be adequately accessible and sufficiently precise.51 As a minimum requirement, it is 
necessary that applicants have an indication of the legal rules that apply to their case in order 
to foresee to a reasonable degree the consequences of their actions.52 This obligation is 
potentially frustrated here because, in most cases, applicants remain completely in the dark 
                                                 
49 See note 3 above, para 121.  
50 Law 67/2005, Section 8(4). 
51 Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (Application no. 6538/74) (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 245, para 49. 
52 Ibid. 
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about the outcome of the remedying process, namely the amount of compensation they can 
expect to receive. Thus, in Hentrich v France, the ECtHR found a law interfering with the 
applicant’s property rights to be in violation of Article 1-1 because it ‘operated arbitrarily and 
selectively and was scarcely foreseeable, and it was not attended by the basic procedural 
safeguards’.53 Perhaps more problematic however, is the effect of this uncertainty in terms of 
how the IPC is perceived by the GC population. In particular, leaving the applicants in the dark 
about the compensation amount they will receive, risks disappointing them and making them 
feel that they have been cheated. While it is uncertain whether applicants actually experience 
such disappointment, the high percentage of applications that have been submitted to the IPC 
and then subsequently revoked before a final decision has been made, is a worrisome 
indication.54   
 
In addition to the lack of information, assessing whether the compensation amount provided 
by the IPC is adequate becomes difficult due to several disagreements of principle. More 
specifically, the decision of whether the compensation amount falls far below the market price 
depends on what one understands by the ‘market’ in the first place.55 GC argue that in order 
for the applicants to be adequately remedied for their loss and return to their original position 
as much as possible, they must be compensated as if the Turkish invasion had never taken 
place. They further submit that the market prices in the north today do not really reflect the 
properties’ true value because two external factors keep them artificially low. First, the fleeing 
of GC from the north due to the 1974 invasion has meant that the demand for (and therefore 
the market price of) properties has gone down. Second, the legal uncertainty about who is the 
true owner of the properties makes it less likely that foreigners will invest there, which again 
reduces property prices.56 It is for this reason that when GC applicants were submitting 
estimations of the value of their properties to the ECtHR, they compared them with similar 
properties in the south, rather than the north, of Cyprus.57 Conversely, TC argue that the market 
price is simply the amount for which a property can be sold today. Thus, the only relevant 
market in this equation should be the one that exists in the north. It is this latter approach that 
has been adopted both by the IPC and the ECtHR. As the Court put it in Loizidou, ‘[t]he 
applicant was entitled to be fully compensated for loss of access to and control of her property 
but not for the diminished value of that property due to the general political situation.’58  
 
Leaving aside disagreements of principle, the best way to assess the adequacy of the IPC’s 
awards is to compare them with those of the ECtHR. This becomes possible due to a series of 
cases whose merits the ECtHR decided before, but whose just satisfaction it decided after, 
Demopoulos.59 In those cases, Turkey argued that since the IPC was considered by the Court 
to be an effective remedy, it – rather than the ECtHR – should compensate the applicants. As 
part of its submissions to the Court therefore, Turkey included a list of the compensation 
amounts that the IPC would have provided to each applicant. The Court rejected the submission 
and awarded its own damages, thus providing a useful comparison between the amount asked 
                                                 
53 Hentrich v. France (Application no. 13616/88) (1994) 18 E.H.R.R. 440, para 42. 
54 154 out of 935 cases submitted to the IPC have been revoked to date. (Note 41 above, p 5.)  
55 For a theoretical discussion of this debate, see note 24 above, p 333. 
56 The uncertainty of ‘TRNC’ titles was confirmed by the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in Apostolides v Orams, C-420/07, EU:C:2009:271. 
57 Strati v. Turkey (Application no. 16082/90) (2010), para 31. 
58 Loizidou v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) (Application no. 15318/89) (1998) 26 E.H.R.R. CD 5, para 30. 
59 See, for example, note 57 above.  
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by the applicant, that offered by the IPC and that which was ultimately ordered by the ECtHR.60 
The numbers suggest that what the applicants were asking for and what the IPC was providing 
were indeed worlds apart.61 The Court has tried to navigate the middle ground between the two 
sides by pointing out on the one hand that the GC claims were exaggerated, but finding on the 
other that the IPC’s suggested amounts did not compensate the applicants to a sufficient 
degree.62 Ultimately however, the compensation award ordered by the ECtHR was closer to 
the amount offered by the IPC rather than that requested by the applicants.63  
 
The human rights compatibility of this remedy is further supported by the Court’s long-
standing practice of giving States a wide margin of appreciation and allowing them to 
determine what is a fair compensation amount.64 The ECtHR has therefore held that although 
some compensation has to be paid to the applicants, this does not have to be the full market 
price of the property.65 In fact, the Court’s previous case law suggests that under specific 
conditions, the margin of appreciation becomes even wider. Such conditions include the 
existence of transitional situations resulting in ‘a wide-reaching but controversial legislative 
scheme with significant economic impact for the country as a whole’66 and the exceptional 
context of the German reunification.67  Arguably the context in Cyprus and other societies 
divided by frozen conflicts, whereby potentially thousands of applicants will be remedied for 
their displacement, also amounts to such an exceptional situation. Therefore, despite 
complaints that the Commission is compensating applicants with a lower award than what they 
would have received at the ECtHR, or than the amount they would have secured had they sold 
their property themselves, this is unlikely to constitute a violation of the right. It is worth noting 
however, that the margin of appreciation in such cases is so wide because the IPC is only 
remedying violations of the right to property; had it also been remedying applicants for 
violations of the right to home, the margin would have been much narrower.68 
 
Nevertheless, even if the compensation amount itself does not need to be increased, it would 
be better in terms of the trust-building objectives of the Commission, if it justified its decisions 
about the value of the award. Although the ECtHR did not make any reference to the Pinheiro 
Principles in its Cyprus judgments, it noted in Chiragov and Sargsyan that institutions 
remedying forced displacement should be in line with international best practices.69 One way 
of achieving this is by enhancing the transparency of the remedying body by offering an 
explanation for the compensation amount that each applicant has received.70 For instance, when 
                                                 
60 However, even this is not a perfect comparison because the applicant requested and the Court awarded 
compensation for the loss of use of the property, while the IPC’s amount reflected the compensation for both the 
loss of use and the property itself.   
61 For example, in Strati the applicant requested EUR 438,710 and the IPC offered EUR 34,531 (See note 57 
above, para 34). Interviewees suggest that the compensation amounts awarded by the Commission have been 
reduced considerably since then. 
62 Ibid., para 34.  
63 Ibid., para 34.  
64 This was expressed in the clearest terms in Lithgow and Others v. United Kingdom (Application no. 9006/80) 
(1986) 8 E.H.R.R. 329, para 122, where it was held that ‘[t]he Court’s power of review in the present case is 
limited to ascertaining whether the decision regarding compensation fell outside the United Kingdom’s wide 
margin of appreciation; it will respect the legislature’s judgement in this connection unless that judgment was 
manifestly without reasonable foundation.’  
65 Holy Monasteries v. Greece (Application no. 13092/87) (1995) 20 E.H.R.R. 1, para 71. 
66 Broniowski v. Poland (Application no. 31443/96) (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 21, para 182. 
67 Von Maltzan and Others v. Germany (Application no. 71916/01) (2006) 42 E.H.R.R. SE11, para 77. 
68 See Paraskeva and Meleagrou at note 37 above, p 848. 
69 See note 2, para 238 and note 4, para 199. 
70 See note 15 above, para 12.1. 
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the IPC compensates an applicant, s/he receives a lump sum of money, which covers both the 
loss of use and the loss of the property itself, without any explanation of how that amount was 
calculated.71 It would have been better for the Commission, or any other body with a similar 
mandate, to split the award into two and list the factors that it took into account when deciding 
each of the amounts. Ideally, the remedying body’s reasoning and key conclusions in each case 
should be made publically available in order to provide guidance to future applicants as to what 
they should expect from the application process. Taking such a step increases the transparency 
of the whole process and avoids legal challenges about the effectiveness of the remedying 
body. At the same time, a reasoned decision shows to displaced persons that the remedying 
body has seriously considered their arguments and that the final outcome of their case is a well-
justified one, thus helping them better understand and accept the remedy they have been 
granted.72 This is particularly important in post- or frozen conflict contexts where the 
remedying body is likely to be providing compensation amounts that fall below the market 
price and might therefore be unpopular with the applicants. It is presumably because of these 
policy reasons that the ECtHR has held that any judicial decisions affecting property rights 
should adequately state the reasons on which they are based.73 
 
B. The remedy of exchange 
 
The second remedy that the IPC can provide is exchange, which allows the applicant to trade 
the property s/he was displaced from in the north with TC land of equal value in the south of 
the island. This remedy is made possible due to a combination of ‘TRNC’ constitutional 
provisions and the (‘TRNC’) İTEM Law.74 On the one hand, Article 159 of the ‘TRNC’ 
Constitution provides that any land that was abandoned in 1974 became property of the 
‘TRNC’, which it can use as it sees fit.75 On the other, the İTEM Law gives displaced TC the 
opportunity to exchange their properties, which are in the south, GC-controlled part, of the 
island, with properties acquired by the ‘TRNC’ under Article 159.76 Most TC have made use 
of this provision, which means that, under ‘TRNC’ law, TC land in the south belongs to the 
‘TRNC’, and not the displaced TC themselves. It is these provisions that Section 8(5) of Law 
67/2005 relies on in order to make the remedy available to the applicants. Exchange has been 
accepted as an effective remedy in Xenides-Arestis, Demopoulos and Eugenia Michaelidou 
Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey.77 Nevertheless, the serious practical 
problems this remedy has posed in terms of its implementation, suggest that it would be better 
if the IPC, and other remedying bodies in similar contexts, did not make it available to 
applicants at all. Notably, these problems stem from the ECtHR’s unwillingness in 
Demopoulos to engage in a serious discussion about the legality and legitimacy of the IPC and 
                                                 
71 Information obtained through the interviews. This is despite the fact that Section 7(5) of the Rules of Law 
67/2005 provides that ‘[t]he Commission shall, after hearing all the views and claims of the parties, announce its 
reasoned decision within three months.’ 
72 This argument has been made in the South African displacement context, but equally applies to frozen conflicts. 
(A Bohlin, ‘A Price on the Past: Cash as Compensation in South African Land Restitution’ (2004) 38(3) Canadian 
Journal of African Studies 672.) 
73 Kushoglu v. Bulgaria (Application no. 48191/99) (2007), para 52. 
74 (‘TRNC’) Law No. 41/1977 (Settlement, Land Distribution, and Equivalent Property (İTEM) Law). 
75 Constitution of the ‘TRNC’, adopted on 5 May 1985. 
76 A Gürel, ‘Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife (Report 4 - Turkish Cypriot Legal 
Framework)’ (Nicosia: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2012), pp 23-26. 
77 Eugenia Michaelidou Developments Ltd and Michael Tymvios v. Turkey (Application no. 16163/90) (2004) 39 
E.H.R.R. 36.  
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the ‘TRNC’ more generally; had this taken place, the problems associated with the remedy of 
exchange could have been avoided.78 
 
The first problem is most vividly illustrated through the ECtHR case of Tymvios, where the 
applicant reached a friendly settlement with the IPC for the exchange of his property. 
According to Section 8(5) of Law 67/2005, the exchange happens between the applicant’s land 
and ‘property which is proposed to the applicant’ by the IPC; in this case, the Commission’s 
proposal, which was accepted by the applicant, concerned two plots of land in the areas under 
the effective control of the RoC on which schools had been built.79 When the applicant tried to 
enforce the IPC’s decision by asking the RoC Land Registry to transfer the two schools in his 
name, the Republic refused. Soon after however, the ECtHR approved the friendly settlement 
that had been reached between the applicant and the IPC and which the RoC had refused to 
recognise.80 This left the RoC with little choice but to buy off the land from the applicant (for 
€13 million) in order to ensure the ongoing operation of the schools.81 The problem with the 
remedy of exchange therefore, lies with the fact that it is provided by Turkey, but the state that 
is most directly and detrimentally affected by it is Cyprus. Yet, there is no mechanism – and 
no political willingness on either of the two sides – for the latter to be consulted in the decision-
making process leading to the award of this remedy. Tymvios not only highlighted to GC the 
practical difficulties entailed in the remedy of exchange, but also raised questions about what 
motivated the IPC to choose these two plots of land in the first place; neither of the two 
considerations contributed to the betterment of inter-ethnic relations on the island. 
 
The second, and more fundamental problem with this remedy is its lack of principle, which can 
lead to contradictory decisions about who is entitled to what. The ECtHR has already held in 
Kazali v. Cyprus that TC properties in the areas controlled by the RoC belong to the TC 
themselves, not the ‘TRNC’.82 Accordingly, these properties fall under (RoC) Law 139/1991, 
which makes the RoC Minister of Interior responsible for their protection and authorises him 
to exercise control over them until the Cyprus problem has been resolved. In Kazali, and 
making no reference to Demopoulos that had been decided 2 years before, the ECtHR endorsed 
recent amendments to Law 139/1991, which allow TC to acquire control of their properties 
from the RoC Minister of Interior even before the Cyprus problem is resolved. Therefore, the 
same plots of land are subject to two property regimes: on the one hand, Demopoulos is based 
on the presumption that they belong to the ‘TRNC’, which can exchange them as it sees fit and 
on the other, Kazali confirms that the true owner of the properties remains the TC individual. 
This means that, because of the remedy of exchange, TC properties in the south might in the 
future, be subject to contradictory legal provisions, both of which, the ECtHR has endorsed. 
 
These problems suggest that when designing such institutions, policy makers should seriously 
consider the types of remedies that could be made available to the applicants and exclude those 
that are likely to create additional friction between the different communities. Significantly, 
the danger of the remedy of exchange resulting in a property being subject to multiple claims 
and conflicting legal obligations does not only arise in the case of Cyprus; rather, it can be a 
                                                 
78 See notes 38-40 above and accompanying discussion in the main text.  
79 According to the RoC, a TC individual (and not the ‘TRNC’) owned the land in question; this land was 
expropriated by the RoC in order to build the two schools. 
80 See note 77 above. 
81 S Evripidou, ‘Government approves first ever land swap deal’ (Cyprus Property News, 10/07/2012), available 
at http://www.news.cyprus-property-buyers.com/2012/07/10/first-ever-land-swap-deal-approved/id=0012112 
[last accessed 17 June 2016]. 
82 Kazali v. Cyprus (Application no. 49247/08) (2012).  
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common phenomenon in frozen conflicts. Since the individual complaints mechanism only 
allows the ECtHR to address and create legal obligations for one state at a time, the remedies 
provided by a respondent state on one side of the disputed border, do not have to be compatible 
with (or even take into account) the remedies that are granted on the other. This is confirmed 
by the Concurring Opinion of Judge Ziemele in Sargsyan, who noted that ‘The two States do 
not need to agree on [… the provision of remedies] together. By virtue of their Convention 
obligations, they could propose unilateral solutions for these people.’83 Therefore, if Armenia 
and Azerbaijan unilaterally provide the remedy of exchange, as Turkey does in Cyprus, a single 
property might legitimately be claimed by different displaced people. When the remedying 
bodies respond to these claims, they might be perceived as acting with a political agenda and 
suffering from a lack of independence. Thus, careful planning and even some rudimentary 
cooperation between respondent states before the establishment of such institutions could 
bolster their real and perceived impartiality and contribute to the objectives of transitional 
justice.  
 
C. The remedy of restitution 
 
The final remedy that the IPC provides, and the one preferred by the majority of GC, is 
restitution.84 Nevertheless, the IPC has, so far, awarded restitution, in only 8 cases, a fact that 
is at least partly due to the strict legal requirements that the remedy is subject to.85 Under Law 
67/2005, restitution only becomes available when the property in question has not been 
transferred to any natural or legal person; it has not been allocated for public interest reasons; 
its location and physical condition do not endanger national security and public order; and it is 
outside any military areas.86 However, some of these obstacles are particularly difficult to 
overcome. For example, due to the implementation of the (‘TRNC’) İTEM Law, whose explicit 
purpose was to distribute GC properties to TC beneficiaries, most land has already been 
transferred to natural or legal persons.  
 
On the one hand, an argument could be made that a restrictive approach to restitution is legally 
acceptable. This is supported by ECtHR statements in Demopoulos that the choice of remedy 
falls within the discretion of each respondent state since ‘from a Convention perspective, 
property is a material commodity which can be valued and compensated for in monetary 
terms.’87 On the other, the tratement of the applicants’ homes as just another piece of property, 
which could be bought off, only became possible through the Court’s dubious reasoning in 
Demopoulos that the passage of time since their displacement, even if this was due to delays 
by the respondent state to provide a remedy, could extinguish rights protected under Article 8. 
Moreover, the Pinheiro Principles require that compensation should only be provided when it 
is ‘factually impossible’ to return property.88 Further support for this position was, rather 
confusingly, offered in the case of Xenides-Arestis, in which the ECtHR held that the original 
provisions of the IPC Law did not provide an effective remedy because they did not allow for 
restitution under any circumstances. While it is not clear whether a restrictive approach to 
restitution is legally problematic, it certainly has had serious detrimental effects on the trust 
levels of GC towards TC institutions. GC have historically preferred the remedy of restitution, 
                                                 
83 See note 2 above, Concurring Opinion of Judge Ziemele, para 7. 
84 D Beyatlı, K Papadopoulou and E Kaymak, ‘Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears’ (Nicosia: 
Interpeace/Cyprus 2015 Initiative, 2011), p 110. 
85 See note 41 above. 
86 Law 67/2005, Section 8(1). 
87 See note 3 above, para 115. 
88 See note 15 above, Principle 2.1.  
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but TC have considered compensation to be the best remedy to the displacement problem.89 
Considering that Law 67/2005 is essentially allowing the TC political elites to address the 
displacement problem almost exclusively through their preferred remedy, this creates 
disincentives for the negotiation of a political settlement that will require that at least some 
land be returned back to the GC. In light of the conflicting legal obligations and the 
undermining of transitional justice objectives if the remedying body adopts an excessively 
restrictive approach, policy makers in frozen conflicts are advised to make restitution available 
at least to some categories of applicants.  
 
Moreover, they should ensure that if restitution is an available remedy in the Law, it should 
also be provided in practice. This is not what has happened in the case of Cyprus, where the 
way in which the provisions of Law 67/2005 have been applied (or rather, not applied) to the 
Varosha cases raises the most serious concerns about violations of the rights to property and 
fair trial. Varosha, situated in the non-RoC controlled part of the island, is a ghost town. GC 
who were living there fled the area in 1974, but TC have not been allowed to occupy their 
properties. Rather, the town was fenced off and has remained empty and unused since then. 
The properties found in this area therefore, are ideal for restitution, a fact that was also 
recognised by the UN Security Council, which has called for the return of Varosha to its lawful 
owners under UN administration.90 Yet, the IPC has, so far, not remedied – through restitution 
or otherwise – any land in Varosha. Although the Commission tends to deal with its cases in a 
loose chronological order, the Varosha cases have been left at the back of the queue.91 Lawyers 
appearing before the IPC have complained that if a case concerns several plots of land, some 
of which are located in Varosha and others elsewhere, it will remain stagnant until the claim 
relating to Varosha is removed from it.92 Since the Law includes no exceptions about the 
special treatment of Varosha cases, this differentiation in how the IPC deals with them 
compared to the rest is completely arbitrary.93 
 
The most plausible explanation for this is that the Varosha cases are politically controversial 
and are therefore, better left undisturbed. However, the IPC is a legal, not a political body and, 
legally speaking, there is nothing complicated about these properties.94 Thus, the refusal of the 
IPC to even hear, let alone decide the Varosha cases is in all likelihood a violation of the right 
to fair trial, protected under Article 6 of the Convention and in particular, the principle of access 
to justice. As the Court put it in Golder v. UK, ‘[t]he fair, public and expeditious characteristics 
of judicial proceedings are of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings.’95 Moreover, 
this possibly constitutes a violation of Article 1-1 since it involves a situation where the 
applicant is being deprived of his/her property, yet the State is refusing to remedy him/her in 
any way.96 Equally problematic to the legal issues that arise from the treatment of the Varosha 
                                                 
89 K Özersay and A Gürel, ‘Property and Human Rights in Cyprus: The European Court of Human Rights as a 
Platform of Political Struggle’ (2008) 44 Middle Eastern Studies 291. 
90 UN Security Council Resolution 550 (11 May 1984), Article 5. 
91 Information obtained through the interviews. 
92 Ibid.  
93 Law 67/2007, Sections 4(1) and (2) respectively simply refer to ‘all natural or legal persons claiming rights to 
movable and immovable properties […] abandoned in the North prior to 13 February 1975’ and include no 
exceptions. 
94 This is another example of how more theoretical arguments relating to the legality and legitimacy of the IPC, 
which the ECtHR refused to entertain in Demopoulos, can have an impact on the practical effectiveness of the 
remedies provided by the Commission. (See notes 38-40 above.)   
95 Golder v. United Kingdom (Application no. 4451/70) (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 524, para 35. See, also, Ashingdane 
v. United Kingdom (Application no. 8225/78) (1985) 7 E.H.R.R. 528, para 57.  
96 This was, after all, the very basis of the Court’s reasoning in Loizidou. 
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cases is the effect that this has on trust-building between the two communities. In particular, it 
raises questions among GC about the good faith of the IPC since it is refusing to hear those 
cases that are most likely to result in the granting of the applicants’ preferred remedies.  
 
 
IV. A PROCEDURAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IPC  
 
A. The lack of legal clarity in the process 
  
Equally important to the provision of satisfactory remedies is ensuring that the Commission 
complies with clear and transparent rules of procedure. Law 67/2005 includes detailed 
provisions about the process one has to follow in order to be remedied by the IPC. Initially, the 
applicant must satisfy the Commission that he was either registered in 1974 in the RoC Land 
Registry as the owner of the property or that he is the legal heir of such a person.97 Then, 
according to the Law, the application follows a procedure resembling that of a normal civil 
case.98 The two parties – the applicant and a lawyer from the ‘TRNC’ Attorney-General’s 
Office99 – submit their arguments and ‘[t]he Commission, after having heard the arguments of 
the parties and witnesses, and having examined the documents submitted’, decides on the 
appropriate remedy.100 However, in practice, a hearing stage where the applicants formally 
present their arguments is only available in exceptional circumstances; so far, only 21 cases 
have followed the procedure described in Law 67/2005.101  
 
In the remaining 878 cases, the parties follow a long – and largely undocumented, but standard 
– procedure that is designed to lead to a friendly settlement.102 First, the applicant submits 
his/her documentation and provides evidence that s/he is the owner or heir of the property.103 
If the IPC is satisfied with this documentation, it gives a date for a ‘mention meeting’, which 
is where the friendly settlement takes place.104 During this meeting, the lawyer from the 
‘TRNC’ Attorney-General’s Office recommends the remedy of compensation and, based on 
an evaluation by the ‘TRNC’ Land Registry, makes an offer. The applicant is likely to make a 
counter-offer and a negotiation, which is overseen by three members of the IPC, takes place. 
If the two sides fail to agree on a negotiated amount, they can meet again in subsequent mention 
meetings until they reach a friendly settlement. If this proves unobtainable, the applicant can 
withdraw his/her application or ask that it proceeds to a hearing.105 In case a hearing takes 
place, the applicant can appeal the IPC’s decision to the ‘TRNC’ High Administrative Court.106 
Alternatively, if a friendly settlement is reached, the applicant provides up-to-date evidence 
                                                 
97 Law 67/2005, Section 6(2). 
98 Law 67/2005, Section 16 and the Rules of Law 67/2005, Sections 7 and 9. 
99 Law 67/2005, Section 7. 
100 Law 67/2005, Section 8. 
101 See note 41 above, p 5.   
102 Ibid. Section 6 of the Rules of Law 67/2005 provides that ‘the Ministry responsible for Housing Affairs shall 
prepare a draft friendly settlement agreement […] and serve it to the applicant.’ However, it gives no explanation 
on how this agreement is negotiated between the two parties.  
103 Rules of Law 67/2005, Section 6(1).  
104 This whole process of the ‘mention meetings’ is not documented at all in the Law or the Rules. Information on 
this was obtained solely through the interviews.  
105 Section 6(5) of the Rules of Law 67/2005. Note also that it is possible, but rare, for an applicant who refuses 
to go through the friendly settlement procedure to have the hearing instead. (See, for example, Andreas Lordos 
Estates Ltd v. Ministry Responsible for Housing Affairs (Supreme Court of the ‘TRNC’, C. 1/2014) and Eleni 
Meleagrou v. TRNC Attorney-General via Immovable Property Commission (High Administrative Court of the 
‘TRNC’, C. 15/2011).) 
106 Law 67/2005, Section 9. 
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that he is still the owner and approximately 12 months later, s/he signs the property away to 
the ‘TRNC’ and receives the compensation amount.107  
 
It appears therefore that rather than the IPC operating as the final decision-maker in an 
adjudicative process, it is acting as the facilitator to a negotiation. The argument here is not 
that the hearing process described in the Law is necessarily better than the method of 
negotiation followed in practice. Adjudication might be more transparent, but a negotiated 
outcome is speedier, less confrontational and more likely to be accepted by the applicants than 
an imposed judicial decision. Ultimately however, whether the remedy will be provided 
through a hearing or something less formal, this should be fully reflected in the law. A disparity 
between the legal text and what is happening on the ground results in a lack of clarity and 
certainty of the process, and in turn, to potential human rights violations. In particular, Article 
1-1 of the European Convention requires that any interferences with the right to property are 
‘provided by law’. Interpreting this requirement in light of the rule of law,108 the Court has 
demanded not only that the interference with the right to property has a basis in national law, 
but also that this law is accessible, precise and foreseeable.109 It has, for example, found a 
violation of Article 1-1 in cases where there were inconsistencies in the process described in 
the law, a situation that resembles what is being described here.110  
 
In addition to complying with its human rights obligations, a respondent state should make sure 
that the process followed by the remedying body is transparent for three additional reasons. 
First, the Pinheiro Principles have emphasized the need to ensure that the remedying process 
is as certain and transparent as possible.111 Second, following a clearly defined procedure is 
important for all state institutions, but it is especially so for bodies such as the IPC, which were 
created precisely in order to remedy human rights violations.112 Finally, if the remedying body 
is following a more transparent process, this can affect the displaced population’s perceptions 
about the fairness, neutrality and legitimacy of the other community’s institutions. In turn, such 
perceptions can have a positive impact on the extent to which the applicants feel truly remedied 
and can, therefore, influence their willingness to coexist and cooperate with members of the 
other community in the future.113  
 
Related to the requirement of transparency is the notion of independence. One important way 
in which the ‘independence, impartiality and expertise’ of the remedying body can be secured 
is ‘through appropriate rules on [its] composition that may provide for the inclusion of 
international members.’114 The importance of the composition of the remedying body was also 
emphasised in Xenides-Arestis, in which the ECtHR ruled that the Commission should 
comprise of international, in addition to the existing TC, members.115 In an attempt to comply 
                                                 
107 Information obtained through the interviews.  
108 Iatrides v. Greece (Application no. 31107/96) (2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 97, para 58. 
109 Carbonara and Ventura v. Italy (Application no. 24638/94) (2000), para 64; Beyeler v. Italy (Application no. 
33202/96) (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 52, para 109. 
110 Baklanov v. Russia (Application no. 68443/01) (2005), para 46. 
111 See note 15 above, Principle 12.1.  
112 E Brems and L Lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human Rights Adjudication: The European Court of Human 
Rights’ (2013) 35 Human Rights Quarterly 176, p 185. 
113 A similar point was made when assessing the practices of the South African Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights. (T Roux, ‘Land Restitution and Reconciliation in South Africa’, in F Du Bois and A Du Bois-Pedain 
(eds), Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (CUP, 2008).) 
114 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, ‘Solving Property Issues of Refugees and Internally Displaced 
Persons’ (Resolution 1708 (2010)), para 10.7. 
115 See note 35 above. 
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with this requirement, Turkey amended the original provisions of Law 67/2005 to provide that 
the IPC should consist of 5 to 7 members, at least 2 of whom are not Cypriots, Greeks or 
Turks,116 a change which the ECtHR applauded in Demopoulos.117 Nevertheless, it appears that 
the two international members, who played such an important role in rendering the IPC an 
effective organ in the eyes of the ECtHR, are rarely actually present. The Law states that the 
Commission can convene when there is a two-thirds majority, yet makes no provision for the 
compulsory presence of at least one of the international members.118 As a result, the 
international members tend to sit with the Commission only when there is a hearing, rather 
than also participate in the friendly settlement proceedings.119 Considering the rarity of the 
hearings, most applicants never have any contact with the international members at all. 
Drawing lessons from the Cypriot experience therefore, policy makers in frozen conflicts 
should be careful to not only ensure the involvement of international members on paper, but 
also guarantee that their actual participation is both meaningful and regular. 
 
 
B. Delays in the proceedings of the IPC 
 
The final procedural flaw that can undermine trust-building among the different parties and 
result in human rights violations is an unreasonable delay in proceedings. This has been a 
problem for the IPC, which takes approximately 7-8 years to finalise a case that is resolved 
through negotiations, includes no hearing by the Commission itself and no appeal to the 
‘TRNC’ Courts.120 The ECtHR held in Meleagrou v. Turkey that the IPC is a body that should 
comply with Article 6 requirements, including that of providing timely access to a judicial 
body.121 While the Court has not indicated a specific time frame after which Article 6 will have 
been violated, factors that affect the reasonableness of the delay include the complexity of the 
case, the applicant’s and the relevant authorities’ conduct and what was at stake in the 
dispute.122 IPC cases are relatively simple since all that is required is to prove ownership of the 
property by presenting the relevant title deeds, yet at the same time, what is at stake for the 
applicant is extremely important. Moreover, while the Commission has over the years been 
manned adequately with administrative staff and translators, the Attorney-General’s Office and 
the Land Registry, on which the remedying process also relies, have not. It is for example, a 
frequent phenomenon for applicants to appear at the IPC for scheduled mention meetings, only 
to be told by the administrative staff that the valuation by the Land Registry has not been 
completed yet or that the lawyer from the Attorney-General’s Office will not be appearing that 
day.123 Although these are not judicial organs, their delays can still cause a violation of Article 
6 since according to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the respondent state is responsible for the 
actions of all public institutions.124 Moreover, while it is appreciated that the delays are due to 
these bodies’ excessive workload, this is not an excuse that the ECtHR has been willing to 
                                                 
116 Law 67/2005, Section 11(1). 
117 See note 3 above, paras 76-77. 
118 Law 67/2005, Section 11(2).  
119 Information obtained through the interviews.   
120 Ibid. If a hearing takes place, the process can take significantly longer (see, for example, Andreas Lordos in 
note 105 above). 
121 Meleagrou v. Turkey (Application no. 14434/09) (2013), para 17. 
122 Frydlender v. France (Application no. 30979/96) (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 52, para 43. Exessive delays in the 
process can also result in violations of the right to an effective remedy, under Article 13 of the European 
Convention (Kudła v. Poland (Application no. 30210/96) (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 11.) 
123 Information obtained through the interviews.  
124 Martins Moreira v. Portugal (Application no. 11371/85) (1991) 13 E.H.R.R. 517, para 60. 
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entertain, since it has held in the past that it ‘is for the Contracting States to organise their legal 
systems in such a way’ as to meet their Article 6 obligations.125 
 
Such delays are not only problematic in terms of Turkey’s ECtHR obligations, but can also 
fuel negative perceptions about the IPC’s neutrality, since they are often perceived as evidence 
of the institution’s bad faith towards GC applicants. It is presumably for this reason that one of 
the most oft-repeated guidelines found in international standards is that remedying institutions 
should act in a ‘timely’ manner and adopt ‘expedited procedures’.126 Illustrating the detrimental 
effects of these delays to the trust-building process, are the views of GC lawyers, which they 
potentially also shared with their clients, that the IPC’s delays are caused on purpose.127 
Allegedly, this is done so that the applicants ‘break’ and agree to a lower compensation amount, 
are discouraged from asking for restitution and do not even consider challenging the IPC’s 
decision in the High Administrative Court. Such negative depictions of TC bodies, whether 
true or not, feed into the already prevalent culture of mistrust of the GC community and make 
it more difficult for its members to perceive the IPC as legitimate and impartial. This, not only 
deters people from applying to the Commission, but also undermines the prospects of reaching 
a comprehensive political settlement to the Cyprus problem.  
 
At least some of the accusations of the IPC’s bad faith are triggered, albeit unintentionally, by 
the IPC itself, whose strict adherence to the letter of the law often causes further delays to the 
proceedings of a case. An example of this concerns the obligation to provide written evidence 
of the applicant’s name and identity before a date for the first mention meeting is scheduled. 
Often however, and particularly because official documents were lost during the war and had 
to be replaced, there might be a discrepancy in the spelling of the applicant’s name between 
different official registers. Rather than accepting such variations as inevitable characteristics 
of Cypriot records and focusing on the substance of the case, the IPC requires that the applicant 
provides further evidence proving – beyond any reasonable doubt, rather than on the balance 
of probabilities – that s/he is indeed the person s/he claims to be.128 Particularly striking is one 
TC lawyer’s complaint that the IPC postponed the first mention meeting of a case 28 times due 
to minor misspellings in the applicant’s name or other cosmetic changes in his application. 
According to the same interviewee, this attention to detail and rigid compliance with procedural 
requirements is a characteristic only of the IPC and not of TC courts more generally. 
 
In order to address the delays of the IPC therefore, and avoid both the findings of human rights 
violations and the undermining of transitional justice objectives, two steps can be adopted. On 
the one hand, it is necessary to adequately staff both the remedying body itself, but also other 
governmental departments that are instrumental to the process, such as the Land Registry and 
the Attorney-General’s Office. If such ancillary departments employ personnel that is 
exclusively tasked with working on the remedying process, this will drastically reduce the 
waiting time for each application and help build much-needed expertise among state officials. 
On the other hand, it would be to the overall benefit of the process if the evidentiary standards 
that applicants have to comply with were somewhat more relaxed. This suggestion was 
endorsed both by the Parliamentary Assembly129 and the European Court itself when it ruled 
                                                 
125 Vocaturo v. Italy (Application no. 11891/85) (1991), para 17. 
126 See note 114 above, paras 10.1 and 10.6 respectively. 
127 Information obtained through the interviews.  
128 Law 67/2005, Section 6(2). 
129 See note 114 above, para 10.6. 
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in Chiragov/Sargsyan that the respondent states establish mechanisms that are ‘easily 
accessible and provide procedures operating with flexible evidentiary standards.’130  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The most direct contribution that an assessment of the IPC could make is provide insights to 
those interested in remedying forced displacement in Cyprus itself. On the one hand, the IPC 
could be used as a blueprint for the creation of a remedying body after a comprehensive 
settlement to the Cyprus problem has been agreed. Since it is only serving a temporary 
function,131 the Commission is likely, following a peace agreement between the two sides, to 
be replaced by an institution tasked with permanently remedying both Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots.132 When designing such an institution, lessons from the IPC could point to what 
should be adopted and what is best avoided. At the same time however, the very existence of 
the IPC makes the work of this future institution more difficult because it will have to determine 
how to handle the properties of those displaced GC who have already been remedied by the 
Commission, a task that becomes especially daunting in cases of exchange.133 On the other 
hand, a better understanding of the Commission’s outcomes and procedures could lead to their 
improvement until such a settlement is reached. While following Demopoulos the IPC is 
considered as providing an effective remedy, GC are likely to challenge this ruling and argue 
that the Commission’s practices result in violations of the rights to property and fair trial.134 In 
such a case, a clear picture of how the IPC operates and what exactly it delivers will form the 
backbone of the applicants’ arguments and the debate that will follow.  
 
So far, an assessment of the IPC suggests that its practical impact in Cyprus has not always 
been positive. Anecdotal evidence indicates that flaws both with the Commission’s procedures 
and the substantive remedies it provides, which are likely to result in findings of human rights 
violations, have been perceived by the applicants and the GC society at large as evidence of 
bad faith by Turkey and the ‘TRNC’. In turn, this fuels the GC population’s existing distrust 
of the TC community, its leadership and institutions and undermines the likelihood of the IPC 
contributing to a thawing of the frozen conflict. At the same time however, the establishment 
of the Commission can also teach (Greek) Cypriots important lessons. It can send them the 
message that they have to speed up and conclude the political negotiations to the Cyprus 
problem before the displacement issue is resolved through a mechanism they consider 
inadequate. The ECtHR’s endorsement of the IPC in Demopoulos has also conveyed to GC 
that a remedy for their displacement will in all likelihood not entail full restitution of their 
property rights; their gradual recognition of this makes it more likely that they will more easily 
accept the remedying provisions of the comprehensive peace agreement. Furthermore, the 
                                                 
130 See note 2, para 238 and note 4, para 199. 
131 Cyprus v. Turkey (Just Satisfaction) (Application no. 25781/94) (2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 16, para 63. 
132 This is the arrangement that was proposed in the Annan Plan. (The Comprehensive Settlement for the Cyprus 
Problem (31/03/2004), Annex IIV, Attachment 2). Matson (note 14 above) makes a variation of this argument by 
contending that the IPC could provide guidance for the establishment of a bi-communal remedying body before 
the reaching of the comprehensive peace settlement. While this is an interesting suggestion, it leaves unanswered 
questions that go to the heart of the conflict, such as who is going to finance the compensation awards ordered by 
this body. 
133 I would like to thank Dr. Nikolas Kyriakou for pointing this out to me.  
134 The possibility of such cases reaching the ECtHR in the near future has already been reported in the Cypriot 
media. See, for example, Politis, ‘Property Issue at the ECHR again’ (11 December 2015), available at 
http://m.politis-news.com/cgibin/hweb?-A=309748&-V=articles [last accessed 17 June 2016, author’s 
translation].   
 20 
friendly settlement procedure, despite its many problems, has confirmed that when remedying 
applicants, there is an alternative to litigation, which, if implemented correctly, could work 
very well.  
 
In addition to being valuable to Cypriot peacebuilders, an assessment of the IPC could provide 
useful lessons about the remedying of displaced people in other frozen conflicts as well. Even 
though there are international standards that provide some guidance about the establishment of 
such remedying bodies, both they and the pronouncements of the ECtHR on this issue remain 
rather general and vague. Conversely, examining the experiences of a remedying body in 
practice can provide more detailed insights on how similar institutions in other contexts can be 
improved. In Europe alone, the lessons drawn from the experiences of the IPC could have 
practical implications in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Eastern Ukraine and Nagorno-
Karabakh.135 While there have been no ECtHR cases concerning forced displacement in the 
first three regions, the context of these conflicts is similar enough to Cyprus to raise 
expectations that if an application is submitted, it will be dealt with in an analogous way.136 
Moreover, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine has given rise to an inter-state case and 
approximately 1,600 individual applications to the ECtHR concerning alleged violations of 
property rights, which are also likely to be decided in a similar manner to Loizidou.137 Most 
urgently however, a comparative analysis of the IPC is particularly useful to the governments 
of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are expected to set up ‘a property claims mechanism […] 
allowing the applicants and others in their situation to have their property rights restored and 
to obtain compensation for the loss of their enjoyment.’138 While a comparison between Cyprus 
and the ex-Soviet regions is not always straight-forward, if this is done carefully, it could 
provide valuable sources of inspiration for solutions to their common problems.  
 
In particular, in light of the twin objectives that a remedying body should satisfy – complying 
with human rights and helping build trust between the previously warring parties – 
peacebuilders in different frozen conflicts should consider carefully the remedies that will be 
made available to the applicants. More specifically, there are practical and principled reasons 
why the remedy of exchange should be avoided altogether, while the remedy of restitution 
should become more readily available. Moreover, since compensation will probably be the 
most popular remedy, it is important that the award reflects, at least to some extent, the market 
value of the property. This award should also be accompanied in each case with an explanation 
of how it was calculated, a step that could increase levels of trust and acceptance of the 
remedying body’s decisions among the displaced population. Equally important is the attention 
that should be paid to the procedures followed by the remedying bodies. In particular, the law 
should accurately reflect the process through which the applicants are remedied in practice and 
make provisions for the regular and meaningful participation of international members in the 
decision-making process. Finally, practical steps should be taken to ensure the swift remedying 
of the applicants, both by adequately staffing relevant government departments and by 
adopting more flexible evidentiary standards. A remedying body that complies with these 
guidelines does not in itself comprehensively resolve the frozen conflict; it does however, 
                                                 
135 As of 2009, there were approximately 2.5-2.8 million displaced people, scattered over 11 of the 47 member 
states of the Council of Europe. (See note 21 above, para 1 and 3.) 
136 See, Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Application no. 48787/99) (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 46, para 314, 
where it was held that Russia’s military and economic control of Transnistria rendered it responsible for violations 
of Articles 3 and 5 that had been committed there. 
137 ECtHR, ‘Press Country Profile: Ukraine’ (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2016), p 8. 
138 See note 2 above, para 238 and note 4, para 199. 
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indicate the existence of good faith that can make a peace agreement both possible and 
sustainable.  
 
